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Abstract
In this paper, we deal with a supply chain in which an assembler
orders parts from a supplier. The assembler decides both order size and
lead time for the supplier. In response, the supplier will determine its
production capacity to fulfill the order from the assembler. Compared
with the case where the assembler and the supplier maximize their own
individual profits, the supply chain coordination offers a Pareto efficient
solution and can give more profit to both parties. The implication of this
paper is that the order requested from an assembler to a parts supplier
such as in JIT delivery may damage the overall profit in the chain.
Therefore, the parties involved had better cooperate with each other
rather than emphasizing their own sakes and eventually leading to
lower profits.
Keywords: inventory control, logistics/distribution, lot sizing, lead
time.
1. Introduction and Literature Review
1.1. Introduction
In a competitive business world where there is a full line of
customers wanting rapid procurement of delivery, many
companies are obliged to satisfy those customer needs. One of
the time-based competition strategies is to apply JIT (Just In
Time). In applying JIT rule, many companies attempt to shorten
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the lead time for the suppliers in order to offer faster response to
outside customers. This might not give the expected result or
might produce inferior outcome compared with the current
performance. One of the main reasons for this failure is that the
parent company does not consider nor help to solve the
problems of the parts supplier. When the parent company
requests shorter lead time and the supplier is obliged to follow it,
the cost increment to the supplier due to shorter lead time may
be embedded in the price of parts taking advantage of the
asymmetric information.
Similar problem occurs in terms of inventory. A parent
company wanting to apply JIT and keep zero inventory in itself
would order small amount at a time and this might cause the
parts supplier to set up production more frequently or to
maintain larger amount of inventory or production capacity than
before unless other improvement is achieved along the supply
chain. This is because the supplier now has to rapidly satisfy the
orders from the parent company. In this case, the inventory
holding cost is transferred from the parent company to the
supplier rather than being reduced throughout the supply
chain. Therefore, without considering the whole supply chain,
we cannot achieve the expected cost improvement
In many industries, the cost of materials procured is more
than half of the total sales revenue. Therefore supply chain
management has a great potential for reducing cost for the
parties in the value chain. In this paper, we study supply chain
in which there are two participants, called an assembler and a
parts supplier. The assembler orders some amount of parts at a
time allowing a fixed order lead time to the parts supplier. In
order to fulfill the order under the lead time given by the
assembler, the parts supplier has to maintain appropriate
amount of production capacity. We first deal with individual
optimization problem for each participant. And then we study
the optimization of the whole supply chain. The motivation for
this research is to find a Pareto efficient solution for both parties
by coordinating them appropriately. We calculate the social
welfare increment along the supply chain under the coordination.
After literature review, we give detailed assumptions
incorporated in our model. We consider the optimization problem
in which the assembler and the parts supplier try to minimize
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their own cost regardless of the other party’s interest. And then
we deal with the supply chain coordination problems. In the
supply chain coordination, we derive the possible optimal
solution set for minimizing the total cost throughout the chain.
Considering four cases depending on the parameters of our
model, we try to restrict our optimal solution set among which
there exists an optimal solution. Numerical examples follow
afterwards and then we give the concluding remarks.
1.2. Literature Review
Traditionally, many researchers focused on a single person
optimization problem. Restricting our attention to inventory
control models, EOQ (Economic Order Quantity), a newsvendor
model, and their various extensions are typical examples.
Compared with these, in order to induce coordination along
distribution channel, quantity discount was studied and
suggested for improvement by many researchers (Monahan
1984, Lee and Rosenblatt 1986, Kohli and Park 1989, Weng
1995). Order quantity allocation between two uncertain
suppliers and its effects on the inventory policies of the buyer
were studied by (Anupindi and Akella 1993). Optimal ordering
policy including the number of suppliers to be involved was
derived from three models.
Aggregate planning problem for a single product with random
demand and random capacity was analyzed by (Ciarallo, Akella
and Morton 1994). In the multiple-period and infinite-horizon
settings, order-up-to policies depending on the distribution of
capacity are shown to be optimal in spite of a nonconvex cost
function. In their model, the actual production quantity is
limited by random capacity. In terms of the planned production
U and the uncertain capacity Y, the actual production was min
{U, Y}, which is a random variable. Therefore, we can say that
the actual production is ceiled by a random variable Y. In our
paper, we treat the random production of the parts supplier with
a random yield rate. Thus instead of being ceiled by a random
variable, the actual production is assumed to be the
multiplication of planned production and a random yield rate X
in our model.
(Bassok and Akella 1991) considered an aggregate production
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planning problem in a manufacturing facility with a critical raw
material, and one or more products. The objective was to choose
simultaneously the order amount of raw material and the
production quantity of each of the products. In the traditional
approach, production problem and inventory control model were
said to have been separately dealt with. They gave an integrated
model of these two compared with the separate models. They
developed a model that enabled an explicit evaluation of the
benefit of vendor reliability, as well as those of the integration of
the inventory and production problem. The raw materials in
their model can be corresponded to the parts in our model.
Basically they focused on a single person optimization even
though they considered both raw material supply (inventory
model) and production capacity (production problem)
simultaneously. But our focus in this paper is on the
coordination of “ two” separate participants in the supply
chain(an assembler and a parts supplier). We compare the case
where there is no coordination among the participants and each
party is trying to increase its own benefit with the case in which
both parties cooperate and coordinate to increase the total
benefit along the supply chain. The literature on quantitative-
oriented approaches for determining lot sizes when production
or procurement yields are random was somewhat completely
reviewed by (Yano and Lee 1995), and the interested readers are
advised to read this review paper.
There has been a rather extensive research regarding supply
chain coordination mechanism. Several researchers tried to
design a coordination mechanism to align the self-interests of
individuals with supply chain’s integrated interest. Coordinated
contracts through various tools (for example, returns
rebate(Pasterneck 1985), quantity discount(Jauland and Shugan
1983), two-part tariff(Lariviere 1999), price protection(Lee,
Padmanabhan, Taylor and Whang 2000), and target-level rebate(
Taylor 2002) were designed to induce individuals in the system
to mimic the centralized optimal solution.
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2. Model Assumptions
2.1. Assembler’s Problem
The assembler in our model accumulates customer orders up
to N and then gives that order to the parts supplier. The lead
time for parts delivery required by the assembler is L. The
decision variables for the assembler are thus (N, L). The
followings are assumed in our model.
1. Customer orders arrive according to a Poisson process with
arrival rate of λ.
2. Fixed cost of s1 is incurred for each order issued by the
assembler.
3. Due to technical limitation for the parts supplier, the lead
time should be guaranteed at least lm, i.e., L ≥ lm.
4. Since customer prefers faster response or order fulfillment,
there incurs cost of u per each time unit spent from customer
order arrival to order fulfillment. Denote Xi as the arrival time
epoch of i-th customer order and Ti as the time epoch of batch
jobs dealing with i-th customer order. This batch order of size N
is issued by the assembler to the parts supplier. Then assuming
the assembly time, ξ, is constant and parts delivery is done in L,
we can represent the delay cost for the customer i as u(T–Xi + L +
ξ).
5. We assume that the batch orders of size N are distinct. That
is, each order of size N is processed separately even though more
than one batch are under process simultaneously. This
assumption is for the simplicity of the cost function.
We should note that sales revenue is uncontrollable and fixed
in the current setting and thus can be disregarded in our
optimization model. Regarding the shortage (i.e., unsatisfied
customer order), the penalty cost can be charged to the parts
supplier and thus can be deleted in the cost function of the
assembler. The first two assumptions are usually made in
analytical models. And assumption 5 is made since we want to
avoid the complexity when there exists overlap in case of more
than one order for processing.
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2.2. Parts Supplier’s Problem
Given the lead time L by the assembler, the parts supplier can
possibly produce LZ units of parts during the lead time, where Z
represents the capacity invested by the supplier. The optimal
capacity size of Z should be decided by the supplier. The detailed
assumptions are as follow:
1. The depreciation cost or investment cost of d is charged
against each unit of supplier’s production capacity per unit
time.
2. Due to the random factors in the manufacturing process
and possible problems from processing other orders, the
amount produced and delivered in L is assumed to be LZX,
where X follows a uniform distribution, i.e., X~U [0, 1]. This
means that the production capacity of LZ may not be
realized and can possibly be affected by random yield rate
of X, which is U [0, 1]. We should note that in the case
where X follows a general distribution, F can be analyzed in
a similar way. And the case of additive randomness such as
LZ + ε, where ε denotes a random noise, will be another
extension of this paper.
3. Due to the minimum requirement for capacity, the parts
supplier should maintain at least zm production capacity,
i.e., Z ≥ zm.
4. According to the contract between the assembler and the
supplier, p is charged for each unit undelivered during lead
time of L. The shortage penalty cost to the supplier, p, can
be set as the assembler’s cost increment due to parts
undelivered on time.
5. Inventory holding cost of h is charged to each unit left
beyond the ordered amount N during lead time. 
6. Due to deterioration and frequent specification change, we
assume that the parts supplier cannot produce and
maintain stocks in advance of orders from the assembler.
That is, we only consider make-to-order system. Otherwise,
we can appropriately reduce Z* and produce in advance of
orders.
7. Each production cycle of the supplier incurs set-up cost of
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3. Individual Optimization
We first consider the case where each party(the assembler and
the supplier) tries to maximize its own individual benefit without
considering the other party’s cost. Given (L, N) requested by the
assembler, the parts supplier will have to minimize its expected
cost. This is the subgame which should be solved by the
supplier given (L, N). This is similar to the Stackelberg game with
the leader and the follower. The assembler works as the leader,
and the supplier as the follower. Thus we deal with the
supplier’s problem first.
3.1. Preparation
Given (L, N) by the assembler and no value of time assumed,
the parts supplier will incur the inventory cost during
production cycle as shown.
g(X|L, Z, N) = h[LZX – N]+ + p[N – LZX]+
Denoting LZ = Q, we get
g(X|Q, N) = h[QX – N]+ + p[N – QX]+
We can notice that g takes the inventory cost function as in
the newsvendor model. Taking expectation with respect to X, we
get
Since f(x) = 1 for 0 ≤ x ≤ 1, we consider two cases depending on
whether N ≤ Q or not. For N ≤ Q, let’s denote G as G1 and for N ≥
Q as G2.  Then we get the following equations for the expected
inventory cost per order cycle:
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3.2. Parts Supplier’s Optimization
Assuming the assembler would request (L, N), the parts
supplier will have to determine the optimal production capacity
of Z as follows 
The supplier’s expected cost per unit time, disregarding time
value, is then
Minimizing the cost, we get the following proposition.
Proposition 1. Given (N, L) the parts supplier will choose Z in
the following way: If
Proof:
We first consider the region of N ≤ LZ. In this region, we have
G1 for G in C2.
Minimizing C2, we get Z1* = max{N/L, } where = . 
is derived from = 0. Using C2 is convex in Z, we note the
optimal Z1* for N ≤ LZ is thus max{N/L, }. Solving ≥ N/L, we
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unit capacity cost of d is larger than marginal inventory cost in
Z. Thus we get the optimal Z for C2 in N ≤ LZ as
In the region of N ≥ LZ, we have G2 for G in C2, and get the
optimal Z in a similar way: 
Combining these two solutions, we get the optimal Z for the
parts supplier as follows:
3.3. Assembler’s Optimization
The assembler will decide N considering (s1, u), and thus get
N*(s1, u). In an attempt to shorten the response time to the
customers, the assembler will choose and request L* = lm to the
supplier. This corresponds to the JIT delivery requested by the
assembler for its own benefit disregarding that of the parts
supplier.
The expected inter-order time is N/λ. Expected waiting time
for a customer until its job begins processing is N/(2λ). The
expected cost per order cycle is then supposing the
constant assembly time is zero without loss of generality. The
expected cost per unit time of the assembler is therefore
We get the first order partial derivatives as follows:
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We thus get the optimal lead time for the assembler as
L* = lm.
From the equation of and the convexity of C1 in N,
we get
The optimal number of order size, N*, takes the same form as
in the well-known EOQ (Economic Order Quantity ) model.
Proposition 2. The assembler will choose the order lead time
and order size as follows in the individual optimization case:
Using this result and that of previous section, the optimal
solution for the parts supplier is derived as in the next
proposition.
Proposition 3. In the individual optimization case, the optimal
production capacity for the parts supplier is
The optimal production capacity for the parts supplier is
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Proof:
Using Proposition 2, we note that the condition of is
equivalent to 8s1d2 ≤ λulm2p2. Applying this and Proposition 1, we
get the result.
4. Supply Chain Coordination
4.1. Supply Chain Cost Function 
Rather than minimizing individual party’s cost function
separately, we now try to minimize the total cost in the supply
chain.
Denote the total cost in the supply chain per unit time as C
and then
Before proceeding further, we need to comment on the total
cost function. Unlike the wholesale price term in a supply chain,
we include the penalty term p[N – QX]+ in the total cost function.
This is because the penalty due to shortage of parts is incurred
to the assembler by the final consumer. And this penalty was
transferred to the parts supplier’s cost function in individual
optimization. Thus the supply chain system of the assembler
and the parts supplier should consider the penalty together in a
coordinated mechanism.
The component G is G1 or G2 depending on N ≤ Q or N ≥ Q
respectively. Minimizing C with respect to (L, Z, N) is a
complicated problem. But notice the fact that G is affected by LZ,
the mean production capacity during lead time. That is, the
influence from L and Z is made according to their multiplicative
term, not to each individual term. The cost components related
C L Z N C C s s N uL uN G N dZ( , , ) ( )/ / / .= + = + + + + +1 2 1 2 2λ λ λ
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with (L, Z) in C are λuL, dZ, and G.
Therefore we can see that L and Z are ‘perfect substitutes in
the multiplicative sense’ in the coordinated supply chain. This is
clear when we correspond λu to d in the cost function. In the
coordinated supply chain, we can expect that given LZ we should
make L = lm if λu ≥ d, and Z = zm otherwise.
Each unit of Z or L plays the same role, but the cost from
these is charged to different party (cost due to Z is to the
supplier, and that from L to the assembler) and thus incentive
conflict occurs in the individual optimization between the
assembler and the supplier.
4.2. Optimization
Depending on the region of Q, we have two different forms of G
in C and therefore we have to solve two optimization problems.
One of our optimization problems is for N ≤ Q:
Subject to
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And our optimal solution comes from min{I, II}. Let’s denote s =
s1 + s2. We solve Problem I first. For this optimization, we firstly
derive optimal N* in terms of Q and delete N from our decision
variables.
In Problem (I), we can derive that
where . From solving = 0, we derive . Since C is
convex in N and we deal with Q ≥ N in (I), the optimal N* =
min{Q, }. Since Problem (I) is restricted to N ≤ Q, we derive that
≤ Q is equivalent to and thus get:
Likewise, for Problem (II), we get the following result:
But we can show that . Thus we combine these
two solutions and get the optimal N* in terms of Q depending on
the value of Q as follows.
Proposition 4. Optimizing the total cost function of C in the
coordinated supply chain, we get the following result: If
, then . Otherwise, we get .
Substituting N* into Problem (I) and denoting , we
get the following simplified optimization problem with N deleted
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(A) 
subject to
For region of , we have from Proposition 4.
Substituting this N* into C2 of (I), we can derive that the
objective cost function of (I) becomes that of (A).
Likewise we get (B) as follows.
(B) 
subject to
And our optimal solution comes from min{A, B}.
5. Extension and Numerical Examples
5.1. Extension
In the previous model, we assumed that the unit purchase
cost is independent of lead time L. But in some cases the unit
purchase cost may be a decreasing function of L. In these cases
we should note that the optimal L* may be larger than lm even in
the assembler’s optimization problem, thus reducing the benefit
of supply chain coordination.
We can relax the assumption that the unit shortage cost of p
for the parts supplier is equivalent to that for the assembler. We
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solution as in the coordination case. We denote p′as the unit
shortage cost for the assembler and p as the payment per
shortage unit from the parts supplier to the assembler, the cost
function of C1 now becomes:
Due to the additional term, in C1, L* tends to
become larger and N* smaller than before as long as p < p′. And
in general we cannot derive the optimal solution as in the
coordination case by using p only. But when the minimum is
achieved in Q ≤ N, G becomes G2 and . And
thus L* = lm as before, and we cannot achieve coordination
solution through p.
5.2. Numerical Examples
In the supply chain coordination, we have extra social welfare
of C1(L*, N*, Z*) + C2(L*, N*, Z*) – C(L**, N**, Z**) to be distributed
between the assembler and the supplier. There occurs
improvement in Pareto efficiency (C1(L*, N*, Z*)) + C2(L*, N*, Z*) –
C1(L**, N**, Z**) > 0) in most cases and we had better pursue
supply chain coordination. Here we deal with an example with
the following parameters for our model:
λ = 100, u = 1, s1 = 2, s2 = 4, d = 400, lm = zm = 3, h = 1.
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Individual Optimization Supply Chain Coordination Cost Reduction
Case A L = Z = 3, N = 20 L = Z = 3, N = 2.47
(p = 30) C* = 3865 C* = 2251.7 41.7%
Case B L = Z = 3, N = 20 L = Z = 3, N = 3.01
(p = 20) C* = 3090 C* = 2101.5 32%
Case A L = Z = 3, N = 20 L = Z = 3, N = 4.08
(p = 10) C* = 2315 C* = 1908.7 17.5%
Case A L = Z = 3, N = 20 L = Z = 3, N = 6.8
(p = 3) C* = 1772.5 C* = 1708.9 3.6%
We now construct another kind of example where we have
dif ferent values of Z depending on whether we consider
individual optimization or supply chain coordination. For the
problem with the parameters of
This is an example of Case C. Then we get the following
solution by applying our analysis:
In this example, the cost in individual optimization is 36.4
times as much as that in the supply chain coordination. This
means that we can possibly get a radical reduction in cost using
supply chain coordination mechanism compared with the
individual optimization. The order size for individual
optimization takes into account only s1 without considering s2,
the set-up cost of the parts supplier. This results in a much
smaller order size than in supply chain coordination case. That
is N* � N**, and N* causes a radical increase in total cost. In
this example, the assembler requests much more frequent
delivery of smaller order size in individual optimization than in
supply chain coordination, and this can be corresponded to the
JIT delivery of smaller amount for the supplier ordered by the
assembler. Disregarding the cost parameters of the other party
may thus increase the total cost in the chain.
6. Concluding Remarks
We see some failures when several companies try to implement
JIT in order to improve efficiency. This paper suggests that one
of the main reasons for the failure is due to the fact that cost
reduction is not achieved throughout the supply chain but
rather cost is transferred from one company to a downstream
company. When an assembler requests frequent JIT delivery
through a small order amount, the parts supplier might have to
L Z N C
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hold more production capacity or inventory than before unless it
somehow improves the operation. This is the typical case of
failure. The author observed a case where a tire manufacturer
requested JIT delivery from a tire cord supplier. Feeling obliged
to follow the request, the cord supplier built a warehouse near
the manufacturer and kept a fair amount of inventory to rapidly
fulfill the frequent small orders. The inventory holding cost of
the tire manufacturer was actually transferred to the cord
supplier, and eventually the total cost along the supply chain
became worse off than before.
The cost reduction for the assembler due to fast response to
customers or holding less inventory itself reappears as an
additional cost to the parts supplier. This kind of cost reduction
to the assembler is only temporary at best. The cost transferred
to the parts supplier might come back in a disguised form. The
parts supplier will make every plausible reason for the necessary
increment in contract price. Or it might lower some quality level
of the parts supplied within the range of specification. And there
are numerous ways for a parts supplier to make up for the loss
imposed by the assembler. Even if the assembler perfectly
monitors the supplier and it is impossible for the supplier to
make up for the loss, it at least deteriorates the relationship
between these two parties and both will suffer. 
Therefore we should find a way for mutual benefit. Unless
there is cost reduction in the whole supply chain (not only for
the assembler but also for the supplier), we are not better off
simply by implementing new ideas into our system. In some
cases as in the supply chain of our model, there is an
opportunity for mutually beneficial operation. By coordinating
the operation throughout the supply chain, we could reduce the
total expected cost in the chain. For the coordination, the
assembler might retreat from asking for minimum lead time (lm)
and allow somewhat more lead time in order to get the optimal
value throughout the whole chain. Or the assembler might have
to increase order size N in order to compromise the parts
supplier’s high set-up and thus to reduce the total cost along the
supply chain. In our paper, the sources of the system
inefficiency are the order quantity and the delivery time.
Especially the conflict of interests on the delivery time between
the assembler and the parts supplier was explored in the paper.
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In the supply coordination, we can substitute order lead time
L for production capacity Z if L is less expensive to use than Z,
and thus reducing the total cost throughout the chain. With the
Pareto optimal lead time L**, and order size, N**, the assembler
will choose Z** for its own benefit. Under (L**, N**), the parts
supplier’s action is then consistent with improving the whole
supply chain. The individual optimization in our paper can be
corresponded to the case of Stackelberg game, and the supply
chain coordination to the monopolist’s optimization to maximize
its profit. The amount of cost reduction due to supply chain
coordination is to be shared between the assembler and the
supplier, and the exact amount to be allocated to each party
might be determined by a bargaining process (Eliashberg 1986).
We should note that the existence of cost reduction along supply
chain is a necessary condition for cooperation of each party.
Repeated game concept might be introduced in order to induce
cooperative coordination among the participants in the supply
chain.
In the future, we should extend our model to the more general
case where the randomness influencing actual production
output depends on the planned capacity LZ. The case where we
have more than two participants (there may be multiple
suppliers, the supplier has another sub-supplier, and so on)
may be an important generalization. The case where the supplier
can preproduce to stock inventory of parts will also be a valuable
extension of our model. Another important generalization may be
the case where each party can tell a lie on the parameters. The
supplier may tell a lie on h and d for its own sakes, and the
assembler on p likewise. This incentive compatibility problem
should be resolved to realize the benefit due to supply chain
coordination.
Our model showed the potential benefit which can be realized
by supply chain coordination. But another important topic
should be how to induce coordination among the players in a
supply chain. This area should be extensively researched to
realize the potential benefit.
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